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The development of efficiency measurement and analysis dates back more than five decades (Debreu 
1951; Koopmans 1951; Shephard 1953; Farrell 1957; Solow 1957) with major theoretical and 
empirical efficiency research advancements occurring in the late 1970’s (Aigner, Lovell , and Schmidt 
1977; Battese and Corra 1977; Meeusen and den Broeck 1977; Charnes, Cooper , and Rhodes 1978). 
Since then there have been an increasing number of applications of efficiency analyses across diverse 
industries and organizational structures. Yet, the applications of efficiency analysis to the agribusiness 
co-operative sector remain limited, particularly in the fruit and vegetable co-operatives.  
Information concerning the level of productive efficiency within the co-operative sector is 
potentially important because of the ongoing changes that are affecting performance within that sector; 
increased competition arising from globalization and deregulation, capital constraints, and increased 
industry concentration. These changes will lead to more market-oriented food manufacturing but they 
may result in competitive pressure being placed on Canadian food processors. The Canadian food 
manufacturing sector has had to overcome these challenges in order to stay competitive in both the 
Canadian and international markets. In the case of co-operatives, “how have agribusiness co-operatives 
adapted in order to meet these challenges?” One way by which the growth and competitiveness of the 
co-operative sector can be achieved is through improvement in efficiency/productivity, and this may be 
achieved by rationalizing production costs.  
Improvement in efficiency may be crucial as changes in regulation, technology and other 
market developments reduce the competitive advantage enjoyed by co-operative businesses, and bring 
into question their long term viability. The implication is that inefficient co-operatives will exit from 
the industry in a competitive market, but efficient co-operatives will not. Put differently, as long as co-
operative firms are not insulated from competition by mechanisms such as regulation and subsidy, 
inefficient co-operatives may be unable to continue to survive in the long run, as is true for their 
investor owned counterparts. Thus, the enhanced level of competitive rivalry may force co-operatives 
into adopting low cost and price strategies.  
  The fruit and vegetable industry is part of a complex and integrated network of agricultural 
enterprises associated with the production, transportation, processing, and shipment of fruit and 
vegetable products. As these products progress through these different market channels, value is added 
from labour, capital, and management.  These contributions have a significant impact on the economy. 
For example, the value of all Canadian fruit, including apples, tree fruit and berries, amounted to 
$517.1 million in 2002. Within the overall fruit category, the berry sector accounted for the largest 
percentage of value with 54.5 percent, followed by apples with 31.2 percent, and tree fruits with 14.1 
percent.  
Over the years, agricultural co-operative have played a major role in the fruit and vegetable 
industry of Canada. Fruit and vegetable marketing co-operatives are involved in processing and value 
added activities. In 2002, fruit and vegetable co-operatives marketed over CAN $223.5 million in 
Canada and abroad. However, the fruit and vegetable industry has shown a decline in their market 
share over time. For example, in 2002 the market share of fruit and vegetable co-operatives was 6 
percent as compared to 23 percent in 1998 (Canadian Co-operative Secretariat, 2004) (Figure 1). This 
reduction in the market share might be due to the loss of some of the fruit and vegetable co-operatives. 
The number of reporting fruit and vegetable co-operatives declined from 39 in 1998 to 30 in 2001. If 
this trend continues, it might be the case that a further reduction in the number of fruit and vegetable 
co-operatives can be expected. As mentioned previously, the survival of fruit and vegetable co-
operatives hinges upon their competitiveness with domestic and global investor owned firms, and their 
long run competitiveness depends upon low cost of production or their efficiency of resource use.    2 
 
Efficiency of resource allocation in the economic literature related to the co-operative sector is a 
controversial issue. Several attempts have been reported in the literature to measure performance of the 
agribusiness co-operative sector and credit unions (Ferrier and Porter 1991; Caputo and Lynch 1993; 
Ariyantne et al. 1997; Berry 1994; Sexton and Iskow 1993; Akridge and Hertel 1992; Evans and 
Guthrie 2002; Thraen, Hahn, and Roof 1987; Singh, Coelli, and Fleming 2001; Lavado 2004; Esho 
2001; Ariyaratne et al. 2000; Lang and Welzel 1999; Fukuyama, Guerra, and Weber 1999; Gorton and 
Schmid 1999; Worthington 1999; Brown, Brown, and O'Connor 1999; Worthington 1998; Worthington 
1998; Zou 1992; Stutzman and Stansell 1992; Defourny, Lovell, and N'gbo 1992). Empirical firm 
efficiency studies can play a prominent role in providing useful information for a variety of groups. 
Measurement of efficiency scores is helpful to assess the relative performance of firms. Firm efficiency 
information can then be used by managers, co-operative members, regulators, directors and 
policymakers. However, to date no efficiency studies have been undertaken for the Canadian fruit and 
vegetable industry in general and fruit and vegetable co-operatives in particular.   
Furthermore, although the notion of efficiency is one of the most commonly used tools in 
evaluating performance of firms within the agricultural and food markets, the literature investigating 
the association between cost efficiency and financial leverage is limited.  Co-operative agribusiness 
firms face more difficulties in raising the capital necessary to finance capital investments because of 
capital constraints/structure (Doyon, 2001). One of the major issues concerning co-operative finance is 
the influence of debt leverage on co-operative performance. Theoretically, leverage increases the 
pressure on managers to perform, because it reduces the moral hazard behaviour by reducing “free cash 
flow” at the disposal of managers (Jensen, 1986). This suggests a positive relationship between 
leverage and efficiency. On the other hand, higher leverage may raise agency costs of debt because of 
the conflicting interests between co-operative shareholders/members and debtholders, resulting in a 
negative relationship between leverage and efficiency (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). The 
theoretical literature therefore provides mixed results regarding the relationship between financial 
leverage and firm performance. A study of the relationship between financial leverage and performance 
may provide empirical insights about the impact of capital structure on the competitiveness of co-
operative firms.  
The objectives of this study are to estimate the efficiency of fruit and vegetable co-operatives in 
Canada and to investigate the relationship between the degree of financial leverage and efficiency. The 
contributions of this study are in (i) determining the cost structure of Canadian fruit and vegetable 
marketing co-operatives and measuring efficiency scores that take into account unobserved 
technological difference across firms; and (ii) testing the influence of financial leverage and firm size 
on efficiency. 
Efficiency Measurement 
In economics, the term “efficiency” is commonly used in a variety of settings (e.g., efficient 
prices, efficient markets, efficient firms).  Generally speaking, economic efficiency refers to scarce 
resources being used in an optimal fashion.  Within production economics, the term efficiency is 
defined in terms of a firm’s ability to convert inputs into outputs and respond optimally to economic 
signals (i.e., prices).  This section provides a brief review of efficiency concepts and measures as they 
relate to firm production decisions. 
Measuring efficiency of a firm is important from both a theoretical and a policy point of view. 
From an empirical perspective, a policymaker’s interest may lie in knowing how far a given firm can 
increase its output, without using further resources, by increasing efficiency. From a theoretical 
perspective, interest lies in developing an appropriate measure of efficiency and studying its properties. 
A great number of studies have been devoted to theoretical development of the relative efficiency 
measurement of economic units over the past few decades.    3 
 
Farrell (1957) proposed a framework to quantify efficiency measures based on the concept of a 
production frontier. A production frontier is defined as the maximum output that can be obtained from 
a specified set of inputs, given the existing technology available to the firms (Forsund et al., 1980).  
The concept of a production frontier is consistent with the “standard” representation of technology; 
specifically, a production function. Deviations from a production frontier can be interpreted as a 
measure of inefficiency from a technical perspective.  If the output of the firm lies below the frontier, it 
is regarded as inefficient. 
The degree to which a firm is “off” the production frontier is an indication of technical 
efficiency.  According to Färe et al. (1985: pp. 3-4) a producer is said to be technically efficient if 
production occurs on the boundary of the producer's production possibilities set, and technically 
inefficient if production occurs on the interior of the production possibilities set. Alternatively, a firm is 
technically efficient if an increase in any output requires a reduction in at least one other output or an 
increase in at least one input (Koopmans, 1951). 
A second type of efficiency, as it relates to firm production, is allocative efficiency.  Allocative 
(or price) efficiency refers to the proper (or improper) choice of input combinations, given economic 
signals. A producer is said to be allocatively efficient if production occurs in a subset of the economic 
region of the production possibilities set that satisfies the producer's behavioural objective. The 
location of this subset is determined by the prices faced by the producer and the producer's behavioural 
goals. Allocative efficiency is measured relative to the efficient production function as the ratio of 
“optimal” input proportions to the input proportions actually used (French, 1977). A technically 
efficient producer may be allocatively inefficient if production occurs at the wrong point on the 
boundary of the economic region of the production possibilities set, where “wrong” is in relation to 
prices faced by the producer and the producer’s behavioural goal. 
Technical and allocative efficiency, taken together, contribute to the overall economic 
efficiency for the firm.  If the firm is producing on the production frontier, using the optimal 
proportions of inputs given relative prices and the firm’s behavioural goal, the firm is said to be 
economically efficient.  Economic inefficiency may occur through one or both of technical inefficiency 
and allocative inefficiency, as defined above.  The product of the index of technical efficiency and the 
index of allocative efficiency is a measure of economic efficiency of the firm. A firm that is efficient 
both technically and allocatively has an economic efficiency index of 1.0 (Farrell, 1957).  
As stated above, allocative and economic efficiency both require an economic behavioural 
assumption (e.g., an objective of profit or revenue maximization, or cost minimization). One of the 
fundamental decisions in measuring efficiency is the choice of concept to use. The two most important 
economic efficiency concepts that are based on production economic decision making are cost and 
profit efficiencies. Economic efficiency based on a profit function measures how close a co-operative is 
to producing the maximum possible profit given a particular level of input prices and output prices. On 
the other hand, economic efficiency based on a cost function provides a measure of how close a co-
operative’s cost is to what a best-practice co-operative’s cost would be for producing the same output 
bundle under the same conditions.  
The two approaches differ in terms of some fundamental assumptions.  The profit function is 
specified in terms of variable profits instead of variable costs and takes output prices as given, as 
opposed to holding output quantities fixed as is the case with the cost function.  
Assuming that the level of co-operative processor output is given, the profit or the welfare 
maximization problem for the co-operative is equivalent to minimizing the short-run total cost function, 
and hence, the cost function approach may be an appropriate efficiency concept. Therefore, this study 
focuses on cost minimising behaviour of co-operative firms. In this regard, cost efficiency is an 
appropriate measure of economic efficiency. Cost efficiency is an economic efficiency associated with   4 
 
the input oriented technical efficiency measure (i.e. output is held constant) (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 
2000). As such, cost efficiency is defined as the ratio of the minimum cost of producing the output for 
the firm in question, assuming complete technical and allocative efficiency, to the actual cost at given 
input prices and technology.  
Using the standard cost function, )} y ( L x | w . x { Min ) w ; y ( C ∈ = , cost efficiency can be defined 
as: 
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− = , and  ) x , y ( DI  is an input distance function. From the above, allocative efficiency 
can be seen as the cost efficiency measure (or overall economic efficiency in general) applied to the 
technically efficient reference production plan. The measure of cost efficiency is bounded between zero 
and unity, and achieves its upper bound if and only if a producer uses a cost-minimizing input vector.   
Stochastic Frontier Model 
The empirical results of efficiency analysis depend on the approach that is used and on the 
assumptions imposed under a particular approach. Two major approaches have been developed for 
measuring efficiency: the mathematical programming approach commonly referred to as Data 
Envelopment Analysis or DEA, and the econometric approach. Both methods involve estimation of 
“best practice’ frontiers, with the efficiency of a specific decision making unit measured relative to the 
frontier.  
The econometric approach involves specification of a functional form for production, cost, 
revenue, or profit (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The methodology is stochastic; firms can deviate 
from the frontier because they are inefficient or because of random shocks or measurement errors that 
have nothing to do with efficiency. Thus, the error term associated with the frontier function is 
hypothesized to consist of an efficiency component and a purely random component. Efficiency is 
measured by separating the efficiency component from the overall error term. Some variants of the 
econometric approach require that specific distributional assumptions be imposed on the components of 
the error terms, while others do not require distributional assumptions. By contrast, the mathematical 
programming approach places less structure on the frontier and is non-stochastic; that is, any departure 
from the frontier is measured as inefficiency.  
The choice of estimation methodology has been controversial, with some researchers preferring 
the econometric approach (e.g., Bauer, 1990; Berger, 1993); and others the mathematical programming 
approach (e.g., Seiford and Thrall, 1990). The econometric approach has been criticized for having the 
potential to confound estimates of efficiency with specification errors. Mathematical programming, on 
the other hand, is non-parametric and thus less susceptible to specification errors but does not allow 
decision-making units to deviate from the frontier due to purely random shocks. This magnifies the 
impact of outliers on resulting efficiency estimates. Advocates of the econometric approach disagree 
about whether distributional assumptions should be imposed on the error term and, if so, which 
distributions are most appropriate. Some recent mathematical programming papers have criticized the 
prevailing DEA technique and propose instead the free disposal hull (FDH) methodology, arguing that 
the FDH involves fewer arbitrary assumptions and provides a better fit to the data (e.g., Tulkens, 1993).  
                                                 
1 Efficiency is generally defined relative to the best-practice observed in the industry, rather than any true minimum costs, 
since the underlying technology is unknown.    5 
 
The analysis in this study is based on efficient frontier methodology developed by Aigner et al. 
(1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977).  The approach is stochastic and the observations may 
deviate from the frontier because they are inefficient or because of random shocks or measurement 
errors. The conceptual framework of the stochastic frontier approach is outlined in the next section.  
Conceptual Stochastic Frontier Model 
As discussed earlier, in order to measure the efficiency of co-operative firms, a behavioural 
assumption of cost minimisation is imposed. In this regard, a cost frontier is the appropriate measure 
for economic efficiency. The general form of a stochastic frontier cost function for panel data may be 
expressed as (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000; Battese and Coelli, 1992):  
 C ft = C(wft,yft; β) + (vft + uft)                 ,f=1,...,F, t=1,...,T,      (1) 
where Cft is the actual cost of the f-th co-operative in the t-th time period; C(wft,yft; β) denotes the 
theoretical cost function; wft is a k×1 vector of input prices for the f-th co-operative in the t-th time 
period;  β is a vector of parameters to be estimated; vft is assumed to be an independently and 
identically distributed N(0,σV
2) stochastic error term, and independent of uft;  uft is assumed to be an 
independently and identically distributed non-negative truncation of the N(0,σu
2) distribution, and thus 
accounts for cost inefficiency in production. The most common assumptions are the normal distribution 
for vft and the exponential, truncated normal (usually the half-normal), or gamma distribution for uft. 
The above model accommodates both balanced and unbalanced panel data.  
The general procedure for estimating cost efficiency using equation (1) is to first estimate β and 
εft= vft+uft and then to calculate cost efficiency for each observation in the sample as the conditional 
expectation E(exp(-uft)| εft). This provides an estimate of cost efficiency as the ratio of frontier (i.e., 
efficient) cost to actual cost. If distributional assumptions are imposed on the error terms, the approach 
involves determining the density function of εft , f(εft), and the joint density function f(uft, εft) and then 
obtaining an expression for the conditional mean of exp(-uft) based on the distribution fu(uft| εft).  Based 
on the approach proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982) for disentangling the inefficiency effect and 
assuming a truncated-normal distribution,  [ ]
2
u ft , N ~ u σ µ ,  for the inefficiency effect, the firm specific 
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v σ + σ = σ , and  v u /σ σ = λ ,  f µ is the mode/mean of the truncated normal 
distribution.  The above formulation collapses to the half-normal distribution efficiency estimates 
(Aigner et al., 1977) if µf = 0. 
Once point estimates of uf are obtained based on equation (2), estimates of the cost efficiency 
(CEft) of each co-operative in an industry can be obtained from: ) u ˆ exp( CE ft ft − =
2, where u ˆft is an 
estimate of  ) | u ( E ft ft ε . 
                                                 
2  In a standard stochastic frontier approach, inefficiency is measured relative to the estimated frontier, rather than the best-




In empirical efficiency studies the most commonly used functional forms are the Translog and 
Cobb-Douglas forms. The Translog form (Diewert and Wales, 1987) does not impose any 
technological restriction and allows the economies of scale, size and density to vary with output. 
Flexible functional forms such as Translog provide a second order approximation to the true underlying 
(but unknown) technology. For firm f=1,…,F at time  t=1,…, T, the stochastic Translog cost function is 
used in this study: 
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where Cft is the observed cost for the f-th co-operative firm in the t-th time period, wift is the price for 
the i-th input of the f-th co-operative firm in the t-th time period (i.e., labour, capital and materials), yft 
is output (i.e., value added) for the f-th co-operative firm in the t-th time period,  f z ’s are variables 
hypothesized to affect efficiency, in this case financial leverage (e.g., liability to total asset ratio)  and 
firm size (e.g., gross sales); the β’s and δ’s are parameters to be estimated, and v and u are defined as 
before. Equations (3) and (4) are estimated separately in two stages
3, where the first step is to estimate 
a standard stochastic frontier model (equation 3), and the second step is to estimate the relationship 
between (estimated) u and z (equation 4).   
The regularity conditions require that the cost function in equation (3) be linearly homogeneous, 
non-decreasing and concave in input prices. For the Translog cost function to satisfy the linear 
homogeneity property of the cost functions, the following parameter restrictions must hold: 










i . 0 and 0 , 1  
If the cost function is twice differentiable, a combination of Young’s theorem and Shepherd’s 
lemma requires that the cross effects in the set of input demand functions be symmetric. However, 
rather than applying Young’s theorem to the actual cost function to obtain a set of restrictions, it can 
instead be applied to the Translog approximation, so long as the Translog approximation is twice 
continuously differentiable over the relevant range. This yields the following set of parameter 
restrictions: βij = βji.  
Estimation of equations (3) and (4) can be implemented using different stochastic frontier 
methods: cross-sectional approach, fixed effects and random effects panel data approaches, latent class 
stochastic frontier approach, and random parameter stochastic frontier approach. The standard 
modeling approach to econometrically scrutinize the effects of heterogeneity in technology on 
efficiency across firms is to incorporate a firm specific fixed or random intercept term in the 
production, cost, or profit function. The fixed effects model is an extension of the basic stochastic 
frontier model where the constant term is replaced with a complete set of firm dummy variables. One 
issue is that the estimators of the stochastic frontier model with fixed effects may be persistently biased 
                                                 
3 An alternative approach is to use a one-stage estimation. Wang and Schmdit (2002) argue strongly for one-step estimation 
whenever one is interested in the effects of firm characteristics on efficiency levels. However, given the complexity of the 
random parameters model, and a problem with model convergence, the two-stage approached was adopted here.    7 
 
due to the ‘incidental parameter problem’
4 when the time span of the panel is small (Greene, 2002c; 
Greene, 2002). With the fixed effects approach, identification may be difficult, since the number of 
parameters increases with the number of firms.  
The random effects model is obtained by assuming that uf is time invariant and also 
uncorrelated with the included variables in the model. However, with the random effects specification, 
one must impose strong distributional assumptions on both vft and uft, as well as the unlikely 
assumption that the uft are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. The Hausman (1978) 
misspecification test can be used to decide whether to use a fixed-effects model or a random-effects 
model. However, estimation of the frontier with only fixed or random effects in the intercept terms may 
result in inefficient estimates of the slope coefficients and invalid inferences of the results (Biorn et al., 
2002). In addition, both random and fixed effects cost frontier models assume that any unobserved 
heterogeneity among co-operatives is completely due to their differences in cost efficiency (Farsi and 
Filippini, 2003). For example, in the fixed effects model, since the fixed firm-specific effects capture 
both observed and unobserved time-invariant factors, this may lead to underestimation of cost 
efficiency. 
In previous panel data efficiency studies, heterogeneity in the distribution technology across 
firms is assumed to impact the density function in the simple form of a random effect model. 
According to Baltagi (2005) a fixed or random effects specification assume that all slope parameters 
are the same for all firms, whereas the intercept is firm specific. This is a very restrictive assumption as 
there is no reason to assume a priori that the intercept is the only firm specific parameter. In practice, 
firms’ technologies may be heterogeneous rather than homogeneous (Tsionas, 2002; Greene, 2002; 
Greene, 2002; Orea and Kumbhakar, 2004; Huang, 2004; Battese et al., 2004; Greene, 2002). The 
underlying belief that all firms share the same technology can be challenged, particularly for samples 
including a large and heterogeneous set of agribusiness co-operative firms. Agribusiness firms operate 
under different geographical and agro-ecological conditions and managed by people with different 
managerial and technical skills. In addition, although co-operatives may have access to the same 
technology, they differ in the speed with which they adopt technological innovation. The implication is 
that firms within a sector use different technologies. Models that examine the effect of policy measures 
(e.g., financial leverage policy) at the co-operative firm level should account for such differences. If the 
assumption that firms’ technology are homogeneous is not valid, technological differences may be 
incorrectly labelled as (in)efficiency. Thus, it would be more appropriate to distinguish technological 
differences and technology-specific inefficiency rather than simply assume that firms share the same 
technology (Biorn et al., 2002).  
One approach to overcome this problem is to use a two-stage analysis where firms are first 
segregated into several classes and then separate frontiers for each class of firms are estimated (Berger 
and Mester, 1997). However, one cannot infer that the technologies of firms within the same group will 
give rise to similar marginal responses. In addition, such an approach has the disadvantage of 
estimating the frontier of a particular class without using information regarding the other classes. To 
overcome this problem, the Finite Mixture Model (FMM) approach has been used in different studies. 
FMM was first proposed by Heckman and Singer (1984) for use in duration models and further 
extended to stochastic frontier models by Greene (2002).  
                                                 
4 According to Neyman and Scott (1948), in panel data with T observations per firm and unobservable firm-specific effects, 
the maximum likelihood estimators of the common parameters are in general inconsistent since the fixed effect approach 
introduces many parameters into the model.  
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In this study, the random parameters model is proposed for use. One of the main advantages of 
the random parameters model is its ability to control for unobserved technological heterogeneity among 
co-operatives. In particular, panel data models provide a better opportunity to control for such 
heterogeneities. Potentially unobserved technological characteristics may affect the production costs 
but are not necessarily indicative of different efficiencies. The inefficiency measures may therefore be 
affected by these confounding factors.  
The random parameters stochastic frontier model is applied to accommodate unobserved 
differences in technologies that might be inappropriately labelled as inefficiency. This heterogeneity in 
technology can be analyzed through specification of a model of random parameters. As Orea and 
Kumbhakar (2004) point out:  
Estimation of [frontier cost] functions rests on the assumption that the underlying 
production technology is common to all producers. However, firms in a particular industry may 
use different technologies. In such a case estimating a common frontier function encompassing 
every sample observation may not be appropriate in the sense that the estimated technology is 
not likely to represent the ‘true’ technology. That is, the estimate of the underlying technology 
may be biased. Furthermore, if the unobserved technological differences are not taken into 
account during estimation, the effects of these omitted unobserved technological differences 
might be inappropriately labelled as inefficiency. (pp. 169-170). 
The general random parameters stochastic cost frontier formulation (Greene, 2002) is as 
follows:(Tsionas, 2002; Huang, 2004; Tsionas, 2002)  
() ( ) [ ]
2
v ft ft ft f ft ft ft , 0 N ~ v , T ,..., 1 t , F ,..., 1 f , u v ; y , w C C σ = = + + β =      (5) 
Inefficiency Distribution: 
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           ( 7 )  
where Cft, wft, yft and βf are costs of production, input prices, output and the parameter estimates, 
respectively, for the f-th firm. The parameters βf are distributed according to a K-variate normal 
distribution as:  ( ), , N ~ f Ω β β   f=1,…, F. where β is a kx1 vector of parameter means, Ω is a K x K 
positive definite covariance matrix.  Ω β β , | f  are assumed to be independent. The df vector includes 
variables related to the distribution of the random parameters and these are time-invariant; υjf, j=β,δ,γ 
parameterize random variation which is assumed to have mean vector zero and known diagonal 
covariance matrix Σj. βf(β, ξβ, Γβ) , δf  (δ, ξδ, Γδ) and γ (γ,ξγ, Γγ) are  matrices of parameters to be 
estimated; µf is the mode/mean of truncated normal distribution ; zf are operating environmental factors 
affecting the inefficiency effect; qf is operating environment variables affecting the variance of the 
inefficiency effects. The parameter 
2
v σ  is variance of  ft v , and 
2
uf σ is variance of  ft u.     9 
 
In order to estimate the parameters of equations (5) to (7), the unobserved random term υjf must 
be integrated out. Since the integrals will not exist in the closed form, but instead they are in the form 
of expectations, they can be estimated by simulation. Thus, the simulated log likelihood is defined as: 
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The maximum simulated likelihood estimator is obtained by maximizing (8) over the full set of 
structural parameters (for more detail on this see Train (2002) and Greene (2002)). Firm specific 
estimates of the parameters, θf [βf(β,ξβ, Γβ), δf  (δ,ξδ, Γδ) and γf (γ,ξγ, Γγ)] are required in order to 
estimate cost efficiency. Greene (2002) suggests an estimate of the posterior, conditional mean, for the 

















































        ( 9 )  
where R is the number of repetitions (i.e., draws of m) on mjf, Pft is the (probability) contribution of the 
f-th co-operative at time period t to the likelihood. This can also be computed by simulation during 
computation of the likelihood function. The firm specific inefficiencies are then based on firm specific 
expected values of the random parameters. 
Data Description 
The costs of production, wages and salaries, number of full-time and part-time employees, 
volume of sales, costs of goods sold, long-term debt, number of members, assets, liabilities and other 
financial data are obtained from the annual surveys of agribusiness co-operatives conducted by the 
Canadian Co-operative Secretariat (CCS), Government of Canada. Of approximately 1300 total 
agriculture-based co-operatives, approximately 900 reported to the Canadian Co-operative Secretariat 
in 2001. The agricultural marketing and supply co-operatives represent approximately 450-550 
reporting co-operatives. Three provinces account for the majority of the fruit production in Canada. 
Apple production is concentrated mostly in Ontario, BC and Quebec; berry and grape production in BC 
and Ontario; and tree fruit production in Ontario and BC (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2003).. 
This study focuses on an unbalanced panel of 54 fruit (British Colombia, Ontario and Quebec) 
and vegetable (Alberta, British Colombia, Saskatchewan, Ontario and Quebec) co-operatives over the 
period 1984-2001. Data for the GDP deflator, fixed investment deflator, interest rate, raw material price 
indices and farm input price indices are gathered from Statistics Canada (CANSIM) for the period 
1984-2001.  
Raw material /Farm Input Prices (M): Raw materials are treated as an aggregate input, 
excluding capital and labour which are dealt with separately. Raw material price indices are collected 
from Statistics Canada database, CANSIM. Costs of good sold is used as a proxy for the value of raw 
materials.    10 
 
Capital Price (K): According to the opportunity cost principle, the unit cost of capital for a firm 
should be calculated as the rental value of the capital stock, as if the capital were being rented. The 
capital input group is an aggregate of land, buildings, machinery and equipment. Using the GDP 
Deflator and fixed capital price index, the relative price of one unit of capital with respect to production 
q, is calculated for Canada for each year
5.  In this study, per unit user cost of capital (rk) is calculated as 
q * ) i ( rk δ + π − = , where i is the opportunity cost of capital, δ is the capital depreciation rate, q is the 
acquisition of capital and π is the rate of inflation in the economy. 
Price of Labour (L): The labour input consists of full time and part-time labour. Both the 
number of employees and the total salary and wages are available from the sample data, but with a high 
incidence of measurement errors. The per hour wage rate is calculated assuming 40 working hours per 
week. Where there are outliers, the data are truncated at $25 per hour from above and $10 per hour 
from below based on aggregate wage information from Statistics Canada.  
Output (y): The output variable represents value added (sales minus cost of goods sold). One of 
the challenges in estimating cost frontiers for fruit and vegetable marketing co-operatives is that the 
direct measure of output, y, is difficult if not impossible to quantify accurately. Thus, value added is 
used as a proxy for y. 
Total Cost (C): The total cost represents the sum of expenses for materials, labour, and capital 
for the firm. Prior to estimation, value added and all price indexes are normalized to one at the mean of 
the pooled sample. 
Debt to asset ratio (D/A): Debt to asset ratio is used as a measure of the degree of financial 
leverage.  
Volume of Sales: Volume of sales is used as a proxy for co-operative size. Other firm size 
indicators used in the literature include dollar value of assets and the number of employees. Table 1 
provides descriptive statistics for the unbalanced sample observations of fruit and vegetable marketing 
co-operatives over the period 1984-2001. 
Results 
Model selection tests are conducted to choose from among competing stochastic frontier models 
(i.e., the random effects model and the random parameters model) (Table 2). Results suggest that the 
random parameters model outperforms the random effects stochastic frontier models. Consistent with 
the theoretical argument, the degree of efficiency is found to be higher for the random parameters 
approach (i.e., 0.72 percent efficient) than that from the random effects (i.e., 12 percent efficient) 
approach. The main conclusion of this study is that the degree of efficiency is greater when taking into 
account unobserved heterogeneity in technology than it would be suggested by the conventional 
measure. These results suggest that, from a theoretical perspective, the choice of model may matter in 
the estimation of efficiency and its policy implication. Ignoring the reality that different co-operatives 
face different technologies may be misleading so far as efficiency is concerned. 
Since there are two major types of products that are handled by the fruit and vegetable co-
operatives (and the data for these attributes are also available), two separate random parameters models 
are estimated and tested: one with (i.e.,
f m fruitf fi β β β Γ + ξ + β = β , fruit = 1, for fruit co-operatives; 
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k . where i is the opportunity cost of capital, δ is the capital depreciation rate, rq 
is the rate of growth in the acquisition of capital q, π is the rate of inflation in the economy, τ is the corporate income tax 
rate, φ is the investment tax credit, and α is the percentage capital cost allowance (CCA) rate ( percent).   11 
 
fruit=0, for vegetable co-operative) and one without (i.e., 
f m fi β β Γ + β = β ) heterogeneity in means of 
the random parameters. A Likelihood ratio test is conducted to select the best model. At a 10 percent 
significance level, the random parameters stochastic frontier model without heterogeneous means is 
rejected in favour of the random parameters stochastic frontier model with heterogeneity in the means. 
Thus, the following results for fruit and vegetable co-operatives are based on the estimates for the 
random parameters model with heterogeneous means. 
A single cost frontier is estimated for both fruit and vegetable co-operatives. The simulated 
maximum likelihood parameter estimates for the fruit and vegetable co-operatives cost frontier are 
provided in Table 3. Before estimating the cost efficiency scores, the regularity conditions of cost 
function are checked. Linear homogeneity and symmetry in input prices are imposed prior to 
estimation. Monotonicity and concavity are checked and both are satisfied at the mean values. 
Before turning to an investigation of cost efficiency, the estimated cost structure of the 
estimated frontier is explored. Table 4 reports input substitution elasticities and input price elasticities. 
For fruit and vegetable co-operatives, the own-price elasticity of labour is larger than that for capital 
and raw material; all three inputs are substitutes for each other.  
Table 5 shows the estimated returns to scale. Based on the mean value of the returns to scale it 
can be seen that both fruit and vegetable co-operatives are operating in the region of increasing returns 
to scale. This may suggest that larger-sized co-operatives are more cost effective.  
In the estimation of a stochastic frontier the variance parameters have important implications. 
Given the estimates of σu and σv, the results suggest that 81 percent of the deviation from the frontier 
cost of production is attributable to cost inefficiency. In addition, the fact that λ is statistically 
significant suggests the existence of cost inefficiency for the sample co-operatives. Table 6 reports the 
average cost efficiency for the fruit and vegetable co-operatives. The estimated mean cost efficiency is 
0.72 or 72 percent (Table 6).  
Table 7 presents the relationship between average sample observations characteristics and 
efficiency for fruit and vegetable marketing co-operatives. For fruit and vegetable co-operatives, 
sample observations with large sales values are characterized by lower efficiency. However, there is no 
definite relationship between asset values and efficiency for fruit and vegetable co-operative sample 
observations. As well, the relationship between leverage and efficiency is ambiguous. In general, 
observations with higher return on assets appear to be more efficient as compared to those with lower 
returns. Sample observations with larger numbers of employees are more efficient. 
Table 8 presents descriptive statistics for individual co-operative. For 20 (80) percent of fruit 
and vegetable co-operatives, individual firm efficiency and firm size are positively (negatively) 
correlated over the sample period. This indicates that the efficiency of 20 percent of fruit and vegetable 
co-operatives increases with firm size whereas the efficiency of 80 percent of fruit and vegetable co-
operatives decreases with firm size. For 39 percent of fruit and vegetable co-operatives, efficiency and 
financial leverage are positively correlated, suggesting that their efficiency increases with the financial 
leverage. On the other hand, for 61 percent of fruit and vegetable co-operatives, efficiency and 
financial leverage are negatively correlated, suggesting that firm efficiency decreases with the financial 
leverage. For fruit and vegetable co-operatives, a summary of the firms’ average, minimum and 
maximum efficiencies the same period is provided in Table 8. Firms’ average efficiency ranges 
between 0.615 and 0.772 while firms’ minimum and maximum efficiency ranges, respectively, 
between 0.032 and 0.680, and 0.756 and 0.959. The correlation between firms’ average efficiency and 
firm size is 0.023 while the correlation between the firms’ average efficiency and leverage ratio is -
0.02.   12 
 
The random parameters Tobit regression is used to rigorously (i.e., statistically) investigate the 
relationship between efficiency and the degree of financial leverage. The Tobit regression random 
parameter estimates for factors affecting cost efficiency are given in Table 9. The results indicate that 
co-operative size is quadratically related to cost efficiency. This suggests that smaller-sized and larger-
sized fruit and vegetable co-operatives are more cost efficient than medium-sized co-operatives. As 
discussed earlier, the basic implication of technological and organizational theories emphasizing 
transaction and agency costs of firm size is that within a specific industry (common production 
technology) and within a common institutional environment, firm size and efficiency may be linked 
through a trade-off of economies of scale and transactions costs and agency costs. In the case of fruit 
and vegetable co-operatives case, transaction and agency costs of size may more than offset the 
benefits from economies of scale for medium-sized co-operatives as compared to their smaller and 
larger counterparts. This is particularly possible if the organization cost curve is concave from above 
and if at the same time the vertical distance between the average costs of production and organizing 
costs is at its maximum at a medium firm size. The degree of financial leverage is found to have, on 
average, a negative impact on the cost efficiency of fruit and vegetable co-operatives which may 
suggest the likely negative impact of financial pressure on co-operative performance. This is consistent 
with the descriptive results presented in Table 7 and 8.  
Previous studies also reported the existence of relationship between the degree of financial 
leverage and efficiency. These studies revealed that firms may be operating at various levels of cost 
inefficiency due to differences in their capital structures (Nasr et al., 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Johnson, 1997; Michaelas et al., 1999). Yet, Nasr et al. (1998) found a positive relationship between 
efficiency and financial structure, where the linkage is reflective of the motivation provided by 
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow concept and the credit evaluation concept. Results in this study support 
Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency cost concept. Monitoring, bonding, and adverse incentive costs 
may be incurred in  a borrower-lender relationship in order to resolve problems of asymmetric 
information and misaligned incentives between the two parties (Jensen and Meckling, 1986). From the 
above, a substantial number of fruit and vegetable marketing co-operatives could be more efficient by 
adjusting their capital structure.  
Concluding Remarks 
Evidence from this study suggests that there may be some potential for cost reduction through 
improved efficiency that would in turn add value to co-operative members’ outputs.  For example, 
costs of adding value would have been decreased on average by approximately 28 percent had the co-
operatives operated at their respective frontiers. Thus, decision makers of co-operative may focus on 
using inputs of production (i.e., labour, capital and material) more efficiently in addition to only 
focusing on increasing their size. 
Given the empirical evidence in this study, the following conclusions may be made: i) the 
approach used to estimate efficiency matters; ii) the estimated cost inefficiencies are statistically 
significant; ii) there is significant inter-firm variation in efficiency; iv) smaller-sized and larger-sized 
fruit and vegetable marketing co-operatives are more cost efficient; and v) higher financial leverage has 
likely contributed to some of the cost inefficiencies.  
A few comments on this research are important. The results show that agricultural policy that 
focuses on improving efficiency of agribusiness firms may have different impacts on different co-
operatives. Random parameters stochastic frontier estimation offers a way to model firm-specific 
behaviour and account for technological heterogeneity across firms. One explanation for the inverse 
relationship between cost efficiency and financial leverage may be that sticking to co-operative 
principles might have made it difficult for co-operatives to lower financing costs by raising relatively   13 
 
cheaper funds from public investors/ stock market. Obtaining sufficient equity capital is expected to 
improve co-operative efficiency.  
There are several ways in which the current research on Canadian agricultural supply and 
marketing co-operatives may be extended. For example, are there differences in efficiency between 
traditional co-operative and new generation co-operative structures within the same industry? Are there 
differences in efficiency between co-operatives and investor-owned firms in the same industry? Does 
ownership structure matter? Does the geographical location of the firm matter?   14 
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Figure 1. Estimates of Trends in Market Shares (percent) of Fruit and Vegetable Marketing Co-























Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Average and Standard Deviations) for Fruit and Vegetable Marketing 
Co-operatives by Activity (1984-2001)  
     Fruit  Vegetable   
Total  Costs  (Million CAN$)  5.783  (7.248)  7.174  (8.823) 
Sales  (Million  CAN$)  7.975 (10.301)  8.71 (11.463) 
Value added (million CAN$)  3.6  (6.237)  2.621  (4.636) 
Return  on  Assets  0.075 (0.188)  0.034 (0.148) 
Debt to Assets ratio  0.6085  (0.279)  0.6909  (0.247) 
Total Assets (Million CAN$)  3.884  (5.807)  3.057  (4.505) 
Employees  (#)  24 (52)  24 (41) 
Members  (#)  117 (122)  95 (177) 
Number of Observation  (n= 213)    (n= 250)   
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations 
Table 2. Tests Results for Model Selection between Homogeneous Technology and Heterogeneous 
Technologies Stochastic Frontier Models and the Associated Mean Efficiency Scores 
 Homogeneous  technology 
(Random Effects) 
Heterogeneous Technologies 
(Random Parameters without heterogeneity) 
LLF  -416.199 -356.495 
AIC  858.397 758.990 
BIC  912.187 854.158 
Mean Cost Efficiency  0.116 0.738 
SE of Cost Efficiency  0.200 0.097 
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Table 3. Parameter Estimates for Random Parameter Stochastic Cost Frontier Model for Fruit and 
Vegetable Marketing Co-operatives in Canada, 1984-2001  
  Posterior Means for 
Random parameters 
(β’s) 
Posterior Heterogeneity in the 
means (Fruit Dummy) – (ξ’s) 
Posterior Standard Deviation of 
Random Parameters 
(Γβ’s) 
Constant  14.568*** (0.078)  -0.307*** (0.078)  1.121*** (0.020) 
Raw  0.351 (0.340)  -1.745*** (0.411)  0.519*** (0.082) 
Labour  0.432*** (0.121)  -0.281** (0.142)  0.160*** (0.028) 
Value Added  0.555*** (0.037)  -0.345*** (0.044)  0.269*** (0.006) 
Raw
2  -0.409 (1.674)  -5.817*** (2.240)  0.711 (0.704) 
Raw*Labour  -0.045 (0.485)  0.229 (0.664)  1.209*** (0.227) 
Labour
2  -1.733*** (0.522)  2.832*** (0.639)  1.373*** (0.142) 
Raw*Value  0.062 (0.113)  -0.203 (0.140)  0.033 (0.029) 
Labour*Value  0.188*** (0.055)  -0.160*** (0.064)  0.149*** (0.011) 
Value
2  0.036*** (0.014)  -0.021 (0.017)  0.109*** (0.003) 
Time 0.024***  (0.003) -- --  -- -- 
σu  0.460      
σv  0.223      
σ  0.511*** (0.008)    
λ  2.061*** (0.100)    
LLF  -347.720      
Firms  54      
N  463      
Halton draws  200      
Note: *, **, *** refers to 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively, level of significance. Figures in parentheses 
are standard deviations 
Table 4.  Input Elasticities of Substitution and Input Price Elasticities for Fruit and Vegetable Co-
operatives 
  Input Substitution Elasticities  Input Demand Price Elasticities 
 Material  Labour Capital Material Labour  Capital
Material -0.993  0.658 10.692 -0.763 0.506  8.219
Labour 0.658  -64.566 172.255 0.112 -10.184  0.894
Capital 10.692  172.255 -616.625 0.651 12.387  -0.093
 
Table 5. Average Returns to Scale for Fruit and Vegetable Co-operatives in Canada, 1984- 2001 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Fruit 3.249  0.971 
Vegetable   3.284  0.782 
Overall   3.268  0.873 
 
Table 6. Distribution of Cost Efficiency for Fruit and vegetable Co-operatives in Canada, 1984-2001 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum  CV 
Fruit   0.720  0.116  0.257  0.918  0.161 
Vegetable   0.720  0.117  0.032  0.959  0.163 
Overall   0.720  0.117  0.032  0.959  0.163 
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Table 7. Average Fruit and Vegetable Co-operative Firm Characteristics by Efficiency Indices 
Categories, 1984-2001  
 Efficiency  Scores 
Firm 
Characteristics 
< 0.50  0.5 - 0.59  0.60 - 0.69  0.70  - 0.79  0.80 - 0.89    > 0.89  Mean 
Cost
(a)  9.825 8.868 8.104 5.961  4.769  2.182  6.534
Sales
(a)  10.571 10.357 9.621 7.880  7.130  4.492  8.372
Value Added
(a)  1.403 3.025 2.910 3.186  3.379  3.718  3.071
Assets
(a)  2.243 3.727 3.722 3.570  2.916  5.110  3.437
ROA
(b)   0.049 0.027 0.033 0.057  0.071  0.092  0.052
Leverage
(b)  0.637 0.713 0.682 0.641  0.629  0.656  0.653
Employee 
(c)  10 18 22 27  25  35  24
Member
(c)  82 116 131 102  86  106  105
N  24 35 104 192  99  9 463
Note: (a) million Canadian dollars; (b) = ratio; (c) = number; ROA= return on assets; leverage= liability to asset ratio; and N 
= number of observations in a panel.   21 
 
Table 8. A Summary of Average Efficiency, Sales, Assets and Debt to Asset Ratio for Individual Fruit and Vegetable Co-operative 
Firms over the Period 1984-2001 
Fruit  Efficiency  Sales (million $)  Assets (Million $)  Debt to Asset ratio 
Firm Average Minimum Maximum Average Minimum Maximum Average Minimum Maximum Average Minimum Maximum 
2  0.710 0.353 0.898  10.295 5.306  18.948  1.913 1.040 3.471  0.374 0.161 0.663 
4 0.753  0.600  0.837 2.707  1.760  4.395 0.611  0.258  1.026 0.757  0.317  1.000 
5  0.725  0.521  0.925 37.587  12.804  48.711 24.083  16.326  29.401  0.655  0.506  0.829 
6 0.695  0.422  0.906 7.752  4.363  16.188 3.836  2.975  5.181 0.953  0.706  0.990 
8 0.752  0.605  0.857  15.138 13.073  17.417 8.307  5.645  12.846 0.846  0.673  0.960 
11  0.707  0.481  0.838 52.494  48.593  59.283 11.077  8.918  12.299  0.759  0.650  0.941 
13 0.719  0.577  0.914  14.839 11.526  18.272 9.531  6.888  11.197 0.610  0.318  0.871 
17 0.736  0.507  0.847 9.030  5.994  17.318 3.816  2.672  5.012 0.914  0.863  0.981 
18 0.697  0.486  0.867  17.298 12.771  22.383 2.710  2.408  3.023 0.884  0.728  1.000 
19  0.713 0.448 0.864  13.427 5.016  23.577  4.223 1.724 7.318  0.781 0.467 0.942 
21 0.737  0.441  0.845 9.132  3.115  22.271 2.026  1.022  2.990 0.636  0.295  0.965 
22  0.678 0.473 0.842  13.152 7.573  21.347  1.997 1.150 3.277  0.767 0.719 0.811 
24 0.737  0.032  0.892 0.206  0.031  1.721 0.057  0.037  0.118 0.125  0.020  0.519 
25 0.632  0.319  0.959 3.380  0.631  4.350 0.360  0.198  0.718 0.849  0.749  1.000 
28 0.738  0.645  0.799 1.180  1.044  1.387 1.665  1.612  1.780 0.610  0.590  0.637 
53 0.734  0.358  0.824 8.746  2.772  23.765 0.971  0.116  3.732 0.591  0.459  0.798 
55 0.734  0.606  0.864 2.601  1.820  3.748 1.186  0.548  2.230 0.695  0.578  0.785 
63 0.615  0.417  0.842 1.254  0.248  1.780 0.120  0.073  0.176 0.724  0.452  0.873 
64 0.728  0.638  0.756 0.054  0.053  0.060 0.212  0.160  0.420 0.507  0.442  0.767 
167 0.721  0.600  0.794 0.112  0.036  0.213 0.254  0.215  0.302 0.997  0.990  1.000 
223 0.735  0.513  0.900 0.531  0.296  0.787 0.168  0.129  0.255 0.782  0.279  1.000 
229 0.692  0.433  0.911 0.862  0.104  1.910 0.354  0.127  0.715 0.543  0.215  0.747 
233  0.744 0.621 0.860  11.299 7.694  16.726  8.655 6.434  11.228  0.902 0.864 0.933 
235  0.720 0.500 0.885  15.223 4.353  27.598  3.689 1.082 6.640  0.558 0.339 0.713 
244  0.751 0.678 0.839  11.028 5.688  15.214  4.565 2.413 7.790  0.419 0.177 0.674 
248 0.715  0.624  0.849 3.752  3.046  4.361 1.601  1.257  1.845 0.375  0.282  0.445 
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Table 8 continued 
250 0.740  0.604  0.823 1.423  1.140  1.705 1.105  0.660  1.538 0.862  0.789  0.916 
254 0.748  0.475  0.908 9.167  5.661  13.998 5.994  3.298  12.648 0.916  0.828  1.000 
265 0.734  0.680  0.826 5.843  4.128  6.451 0.782  0.678  0.939 0.773  0.726  0.844 
266 0.724  0.606  0.809 0.515  0.333  0.780 0.246  0.169  0.332 0.913  0.888  0.941 
277 0.772  0.666  0.837 0.177  0.143  0.190 0.278  0.254  0.345 0.472  0.412  0.575 
279 0.732  0.639  0.860 0.502  0.319  0.711 0.341  0.277  0.417 0.257  0.161  0.440 
284 0.735  0.592  0.812 1.245  0.994  1.443 2.191  1.837  3.140 0.648  0.540  0.829 
351 0.642  0.257  0.918 0.282  0.056  0.603 0.171  0.013  0.471 0.207  0.000  0.387 
352 0.701  0.484  0.894 0.325  0.117  0.778 0.346  0.121  0.527 0.585  0.137  0.832 
353 0.720  0.469  0.861 0.075  0.018  0.206 0.074  0.013  0.120 0.065  0.000  0.354 
354 0.736  0.586  0.821 0.571  0.336  1.226 0.370  0.224  0.679 0.258  0.052  0.393 
355 0.723  0.412  0.866 0.531  0.201  0.857 0.397  0.137  0.671 0.386  0.007  0.680 
359 0.668  0.356  0.869 0.814  0.129  4.672 0.204  0.049  0.451 0.681  0.315  0.962 
360 0.698  0.502  0.909 0.572  0.305  0.921 0.347  0.205  0.603 0.549  0.275  0.848 
363 0.711  0.489  0.928 3.343  0.415  6.511 1.048  0.385  2.111 0.856  0.473  0.932 
364 0.741  0.671  0.874 1.260  0.889  1.679 0.660  0.514  0.740 0.939  0.886  1.000 
365 0.721  0.596  0.800 1.560  1.176  1.934 0.816  0.610  1.213 0.811  0.577  1.000 
367 0.707  0.545  0.846 1.666  1.149  2.222 1.105  0.951  1.369 0.711  0.664  0.789 
380 0.731  0.631  0.856 1.411  1.068  1.671 0.881  0.642  1.120 0.231  0.140  0.334 
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Table 9. Random Parameter Tobit Regression Parameters Estimates for the Determinants of 
Cost Efficiency for Fruit and Vegetable Co-operatives in Canada, 1984-2001 
Variables Parameters   
Mean Constant  δ0  0.749*** (0.010) 
Std. of Constant  Γδ0 0.001 (0.004) 
Mean Sales  δS  -0.188*** (0.049) 
Std. of Sales  ΓδS 0.001 (0.015) 
Mean Sales
2  δSS  0.145*** (0.056) 
Std. of Sales
2  ΓδSS 0.001 (0.020) 
Mean Debt/Asset ratio  δDA  -0.014 (0.014) 
Std. of Debt/Asset ratio  ΓδDA 0.023*** (0.005) 
σ    0.114*** (0.002) 
LLF   342.876     
Chi squared    685.752    
Firms   54  
Firms x Time    463  
Halton   100  
Note: *, **, *** refers to 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively, level of significance.  
Figures in parentheses are standard deviations 
 